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AN ESSAY ON VMI AND MILITARY SERVICE: YES,
WE DO HAVE TO BE EQUAL TOGETHER
MARY M. CHEH*
There is a license plate I see from time to time that sums up much of
what I think about men clinging to the military as their rightful bastion. It
says "OGROWUP." When the Fourth Circuit recently ruled that the
Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) male-only admissions policy violated
equal protection guarantees, it missed a wonderful chance to send that
message in constitutional terms.
In United States v. Virginia (VMI),' the Fourth Circuit held that VMI's
unique "adversative," male-only educational program was not, of itself,
unconstitutional. Rather, the program was invalid because the state did not
offer a similiar single-sex experience to women. In one sense this result was
a "victory" for women because the Commonwealth of Virginia, if it is to
continue public funding of VMI, must either incur the considerable expense
of creating a second VMI for women, or it must admit women to the VMI
program. On closer inspection, however, the case was a deep disappointment
to men and women who take seriously basic principles of gender equality.
The appellate panel completely bought into the notion that VMI's
mission of developing citizen soldiers "can be accomplished only in a single-
gender environment. ' 2 The court approved a separate but equal solution
that may have been good statesmanship but which rested on weak and
faulty equal protection analysis. Worse, the opinion effectively endorsed
the idea that separate male and female versions of citizen soldiers exist and
that the male model-the model-would be degraded by the presence of
women. The court's opinion reflects less on the adequacy of legal principles
than it does on deep-seated acceptance of certain separate male and female
roles.
This essay explores why VMI is not just another educational choice
which just happens to be open only to men. It suggests why-even if equal
all-male and all-female colleges are constitutionally possible-a separate
VMI for men and women is not. It may explain why the United States
government went through all the fuss to sue a small school in the Virginia
countryside where young men are so serious about playing soldier.
I. TAKwG GENDER DISCRIMINATION SERIOUSLY
Despite the controversy surrounding the development of the mid-level
scrutiny test for gender3 and despite continuing controversy about its legit-
* Professor of Law, The National Law Center, George Washington University. I would
like to thank my research assistant, Jason Weinstein, for his invaluable help.
1. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
2. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992).
3. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
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imacy, 4 heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination has taken root. Craig
v. Boren' is frequently cited as articulating the standard of review: "clas-
sifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." ' 6 If rigorously
applied, the mid-level scrutiny test requires the government to prove that
its gender classification is constitutional, looks only to the actual purposes
of a law to assess importance, and, crucially, requires a close or direct fit
between the legislative objective (ends) and the use of the gender classifi-
cation (means). In this ends-means analysis, not only must a gender clas-
sification promote an important end, but the state must, in effect, show
that a sex-neutral approach is less effective in pursuing its goal. If there
are reasonable and adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives to a gender
classification and a neutral approach can work just as well, then the gender
discriminatory approach is invalid. In a number of "hard" cases, however,
the rigors of the "intermediate test" have been sidestepped or ignored.
7
On the one hand, the test has made short and steady work of the kinds
of gender classifications-usually harming women but also those harming
men-which rest on preconceived notions of the proper societal roles of
men and women.' For example, laws based on stereotypes about men and
women's roles in the workplace, 9 in the care of children,'0 or in the
dependence of one spouse upon the other" have fallen. On the other hand,
cases involving gender discrimination in order to compensate women for
past discrimination,' 2 segregation of men and women in certain contexts, 3
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAuv. L. REv. 1 (1972); John E. Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); see also E.A. Hull, Sex
Discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of Kahn v. Shevin and Orr v.
Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 639 (1979).
4. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 18.23 (1986); see also Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences,
and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983).
5. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
6. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
7. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 175, 179-82 & n.50 (1982) (discussing Court's use of
"similarly situated" inquiry as more lenient alternative to mid-level review in Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), and Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)); see
also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 94 (1981) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Freedman, supra note 4, at 931.
8. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975).
10. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut.
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); see also Weinberger,
420 U.S. 636 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); cf. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 199;
see also Williams, supra note 7, at 179-80.
13. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally
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deep-seated views about sex roles, 14 and the appropriateness of women in
combat 5 have tested the durability and integrity of heightened judicial
scrutiny over legislative choices.
The VMI case picks up threads from these vexing categories. The
question of single-sex schools-though of increasingly limited practical im-
portance in the context of higher education' 6-implicates the use of all-
women's schools which may help women develop as leaders. Segregation of
men and women in certain activities or spheres implicates rights of privacy
and acknowledges the sexual tension which comingling can produce. Finally,
there is the matter of male hegemony in military matters. VMI is not treated
as just any school of higher education. It is a military academy, a school
with a distinguished record of producing "citizen-soldiers, educated and
honorable men" who have distinguished themselves in both civilian and
military life.'
7
Two pre-VMI Supreme Court cases involving sex segregation in the
context of male-only draft registration and female-only nursing school
admission illustrate the different results that can follow from inconsistent
application of mid-level scrutiny. In Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,18 the Supreme Court held that Mississippi's policy of barring men
from a state school of nursing was unconstitutional. 9 The Court closely
examined the state's claim that excluding men was a form of affirmative
action for women and found it unconvincing. The Court thereby rejected,
under a searching analysis, the state's assertion that its single-sex classifi-
cation furthered a state interest in providing women with diverse educational
choices?.2
divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). For an insightful analysis of how the circuit court
misapplied heightened scrutiny, see Note, Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform
or Invidious Discrimination?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1741, 1747-48 (1992).
14. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 955 (1984); Arnold H. Loewy, Returned to the
Pedestal-The Supreme Court and Gender Classification Cases: 1980 Term, 60 N.C. L. REv.
87 (1981); see also Freedman, supra note 4; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique
of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. Ray. 387 (1984); Williams, supra note 7, at 181-90.
15. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
16. Currently there are only four state-supported single-sex schools. There are two publicly
supported all men's colleges, VMI in Lexington, Virginia, and the Citadel in Charleston, South
Carolina; and two all women's colleges, Texas Women's University in Denton, Texas and
Douglass College in New Bruhswick, New Jersey. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp.
1407, 1420 (W.D. Va. 1991). Nevertheless, because of private colleges, there are 11,400 men
attending single-sex institutions and 64,000 women doing so. Id.
17. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1992). The district court took
great pains to note that VMI's role is not primarily to develop career military men. Virginia,
766 F. Supp,. at 1427. Yet the school is run by military officers, and the students, or "cadets,"
wear military uniforms, live in "barracks," and participate in mandatory R.O.T.C. units. Id.
at 1421-25. The institution seems conflicted, to say the least, about its image.
18. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
19. Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982).
20. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), cited by the Court in Hogan, probably offers
one of the strongest illustrations of the Court rejecting loose-fitting generalities about the
sexes.
1993]
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In contrast, in Rostker v. Goldberg2' the Court accepted, without close
examination, the government's unfounded assertion that the purpose of a
military draft is exclusively to raise combat troops. And since the exclusion
of women from combat was not put in issue at all, it became apparently
"logical" to conclude that men and women were not similarly situated with
respect to the draft and that it was permissible to register men only.
22
In VMI, the Fourth Circuit purported to accept a rigorous mid-level
scrutiny approach, citing Hogan.23 It then applied the test erroneously. The
court began adequately enough by identifying the real purpose of a male-
only VMI.24 Under mid-level scrutiny, courts must closely examine, as the
appellate panel did in the VMI case, the real reason for a state's gender
discriminatory policies. As discussed below,2 such scrutiny readily pierces
the state's claim, unblinkingly accepted by the district court, that VMI's
all-male program was justified as providing diversity in Virginia's overall
system of higher education. 26 The military, barracks-style training of VMI
is aimed at producing, according to VMI's own pronouncements, citizen-
soldiers; that is,
[I]t is the mission of the Virginia Military Institute to produce
educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil
life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and
attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service,
advocates of the American Democracy and free enterprise system,
and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of
national peril.
27
The Fourth Circuit properly phrased its task under mid-level scrutiny
as deciding "whether VMI's male-only admissions policy ... is a classifi-
cation justified by a fair and substantial relationship with the institution's
mission of developing citizen soldiers." ' 2 The court concluded that the
unique educational method used at VMI does substantially promote the
goal of producing citizen soldiers. But then, instead of asking whether the
introduction of coeducation at VMI would offer a reasonable and adequate
alternative way (means) of producing citizen soldiers (the end or objective),
the court confused ends and means and asked the wrong question. It asked
21. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
22. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis, see Williams, supra note 7, at 179-
90.
23. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
24. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 896 (4th Cir. 1992).
25. The Fourth Circuit discounted the state's argument that VMI remained a male-only
institution to promote diversity of educational experiences in Virginia's system of higher
education. Id. at 898-900. The inadequacies of a diversity justification are discussed infra text
accompanying notes 57-65.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
27. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 893.
28. Id. at 896.
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whether the introduction of coeducation (means) will change the unique
educational method used at VMI (means). It asked, in other words, whether
the use of alternative, gender-neutral means will change the use of the
current, gender discriminatory means. Guess what the answer was!
True, there were "findings of fact" from below that the VMI adversative
or doubting method of training-including physical rigor, mental stress,
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of
behavior, and indoctrination of "desirable" value-promotes character de-
velopment consistent with a model of the citizen soldier. 29 Participants in
the VMI experience frequently report growth in personal goals of leadership,
responsibility, self-confidence, and integrity. 0 But facts only become relevant
within a context and, when closely examined, what would be lost by the
admission of women is not the production of citizen soldiers or character
building or achieving esprit de corps, but rather particular rituals followed
to achieve those ends. These rituals are neither necessary to the ends of
military education nor very sensible in their own right. It is a little embar-
rassing even to recount some of the behaviors, like running naked through
the showers while some are turned on all cold and others are turned on all
hot.31 Entering VMI students are known as "rats," and rats "are treated
miserably for the first seven months of college." ' 32 Their miserable treatment
includes, for example, indoctrination, minute regulation of individual be-
havior, frequent punishments, rigorous physical education, and military
drills.33 The experience appears to be something of an amalgam of a very
strict English boarding school, traditional Marine Corps boot camp, and
medieval secret society rites.
To say that if women were admitted, their admission would change the
experience is like saying that, if I moved, I would have a new address-or
as Justice Rehnquist once said, it's like saying if my aunt were a man she
would be my uncle.3 4 Yes, there would be a change, but the question is
whether the change would be relevant and, if so, to what? If the aim is to
produce citizen soldiers, to build character and esprit de corps, the relevant
29. Id. at 893.
30. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1426 (W.D. Va. 1991).
31. See William A. DeVan, Note, Toward A New Standard In Gender Discrimination:
The Case Of Virginia Military Institute, 33 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 489, 534 n.313 (1992). The
author describes this particular ritual based on an interview with a VMI graduate. It is part
of a general pattern of "hazing and humiliating treatment that shapes the VMI cadei." Id. at
534. The shower run is described as follows: "All rats are stripped naked and run through
the communal shower with some shower heads turned on all hot and others all cold." Id. at
534 n.313. Other "activities" of this ilk are described in the VMI catalogue and in the above
article. Id. at 497-98.
32. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1422.
33. Id.
34. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 528 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This is not
exactly like the old expression, "if pigs had wings, they could fly." It's more like "if pigs
had wings, they'd be winged pigs."
1993]
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finding would have to be that that can only be done effectively by the VMI
adversative methodology in a single-gender context-only, if you will, by
running naked through the showers.
Virginia simply could not and cannot prove what equal protection
requires: that there is no gender neutral approach that is just as effective
in educating citizen-soldiers.35 The very existence of the coeducational mil-
itary academies refutes the argument.
What accounts for courts tinkering with rigorous mid-level scrutiny in
certain kinds of cases?36 There are differing explanations. With Rostker,
some pointed to the delicacy of showing deference to a congressional
judgment in matters affecting military affairs .17 In Michael M. v. Superior
Court,3" a case where the Court upheld a statutory rape law applying only
to men and not women, the Supreme Court majority relied upon what it
called "real differences" between men and women; that is, only females
can get pregnant and only they, unlike men, have a natural deterrent to
underage sex. 9 Others saw both cases as touching "the hidden nerves of
our most profoundly embedded cultural values." 4
In VMI, the Fourth Circuit may have skated past the full consequences
of a heightened scrutiny analysis because it had settled on the separate but
equal "solution." The court had no reason to raise the bloody shirt of
ending state-supported single-sex education. In fact, it wanted to affirm
35. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 96 (1981) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
36. Commentators apparently realize that rigorous scrutiny of VMI's program would
lead to a finding of unconstitutionality. This has driven some to turn cartwheels to argue for
a relaxation of the mid-level scrutiny standard. See, e.g., DeVan, supra note 31, at 536-40. It
must be quite difficult for the psyche to let go of a state-supported, all-male VMI.
37. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65; see also ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 541-42.
38. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
39. Of course commentators were quick to note the emptiness of the "real differences"
analysis. As one writer expressed it:
The concept of "real" sex differences is central to the Rehnquist-Stewart
approach. Under this approach, the legal problem of sex discrimination is generally
conceived as the use of sex classifications when no "real" differences between women
and men are involved. "Real" differences are defined broadly to include definitional
differences, legally created differences, and differences that result from past discrim-
ination against women. In cases involving "real" differences, review of the relation-
ship between the classification and the goal is deferential. This approach is also
associated with a high degree of tolerance for facially sex-neutral rules that have a
disparate impact on one sex.
The central and inevitable role of culture in determining the existence of most
sex differences reveals the hollowness of the search for "real" differences as the
basis of sex discrimination law. Sex differences are widespread and important because
of human social arrangements. The central issues are not which differences are
"real" but rather what degree of sex differentiation and inequality is desirable, and
what significance existing sex differences should have as determinants of individual
life experiences and collective social structure.
Freedman, supra note 4, at 931, 947.
40. Williams, supra note 7, at 176.
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that sex-segregated education is not only allowable but desirable. The court
stated:
The argument by the government that VMI's existing program is
maintained as the result of impermissible stereotyping and overly
broad generalizations, without a more detailed analysis, might lead,
if accepted, to a finding that would impose a conformity that
common experience rejects. Men and women are different, and our
knowledge about the differences, physiological and psychological,
is becoming increasingly more sophisticated. Indeed the evidence in
this case amply demonstrated that single-genderedness in education
can be pedagogically justifiable.
41
That said, the Fourth Circuit then shifted ground.
II. Do WE HAVE To BE EQUAL TOGETHER?
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that VMI, if it continued as a state
institution, did not necessarily have to admit women but that women had
to have their own VMI was Solomon-like statesmanship. VMI was let down
easy. Yes VMI, your institution, brave and true, could be constitutional. It
is unique, special, and important. In fact, it is so wonderful that women
in Virginia ought to have their own version. But the court must surely have
known about the impracticality of that option. The costs to the state of
replicating a VMI for women would probably be great. An entire new
institution fashioned along the lines of VMI, with instructors, staff, and
materials, would have to be created. A sufficient pool of applicants would
have to be developed, 42 both to maintain sufficient standards and to provide
economies of scale in running the Women's VMI. So in the end, VMI loses,
but nobly.
But the Fourth Circuit, even if it may have "come out right" because
of the press of practicalities, came out wrong on principle. In the area of
military education, there is no place, at least not now and perhaps not ever,
for separate but equal. In the area of racial segregation, the Supreme Court,
in Brown v. Board of Education,43 understood that equality means much
more than the mere equivalence of physical things such as books, dormi-
tories, and instructors-even assuming the possibility of perfect parity on
these matters. The Court observed, "Our decision, therefore, cannot turn
41. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992).
42. The district court concluded that women's demand for a VMI education is currently
unknown. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1436 (W.D. Va. 1981); "Trial testimony
included a great deal of speculation, but very little evidence, on demand for a VMI education
among women. This uncertainty is due to a lack of recruitment among women." Id. In the
two years prior to the filing of the suit against VMI, over 300 women inquired about admission
to VMI. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 894.
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19931
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on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white
schools involved in each of the cases." 44 As it had recognized in previous
cases, the Brown Court understood that equality encompasses 'those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a . . . school.'" 4 The Brown Court knew that it was the very
fact of separation-given the historical and factual context of race relations
and face discrimination in the United States-that caused the invidious
inequality.
So it is with military education and training. We cannot view military
schools as if they carry no historical baggage. We cannot pretend that
military schools and military service are not male-constructed, male-domi-
nated, and central to the concept of male power. 46 If only men are capable
and required to serve their country-to fight if necessary to defend it-then
only they can claim full citizenship. Women cannot realistically claim an
equal place until they are equally at risk. As one commentator put it:
[D]o we not acquire a greater right to claim our share from society
if we too share its ultimate jeopardies? To me, Rostker [Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)] never posed the question of whether
women should be forced as men now are to fight wars, but whether
we, like them, must take the responsibility for deciding whether or
not to fight, whether or fnot to bear the cost of risking our lives,
on the one hand, or resisting in the name of peace, on the other.47
If military training or education is constructed so that it is a problem
for women "to fit," then the answer is to reconstruct the military and
military service so that both men and women "fit." Only women and men
together, with whatever rearrangements that fact requires, can define what
military service is. Side-by-side arrangements will only enshrine the male
model-the status quo-as the model and consign the female experience to
be judged as inferior. That inferiority will then be attributed-tsk, tsk-to
women's nature. Yes, men and women are different but that should not
mean, so to speak, that men are on the top and women are on the bottom.
48
Differences can be accounted for and privacy can be accounted for, all in
the context of equal power and equal service.
Moreover, citizenship is an undifferentiated concept. There should be
no gradations of citizenship-whether based on the length of time one has
lived in a jurisdiction, or on one's wealth or achievements, or on any other
basis. 49 But to be a full citizen, each person must have the equal right to
44. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
45. Id. at 493 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
46. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rav. 499 (1991).
47. Williams, supra note 7, at 190.
48. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination,
in FEuMNISM UNMODIFMD: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 32-45 (1987).
49. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (invalidating Alaska's differential distri-
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share in the benefits and the responsibilities of citizenship. 0 In our culture
there has always been a direct connection between military service and
citizenship. Full participation in voting and full enjoyment of civil rights
have depended upon service eligibility. The story of African-Americans
claiming their rightful places as full citizens is mirrored in their ability to
shatter policies of exclusion and segregation in the Armed Forces..'
A separate VMI for women perpetually will be deemed second class as
measured against the "real" military experience of men. The women will
be continually striving to meet a male-created standard, destined by defi-
nition to come up short. A VMI-Women's Division might even be deemed
very good, you know, for a girl's school, but the fact of separateness will
perpetuate the stereotype of the military superiority of men. A separate
school will keep alive the standard-setting, the symbolism, and the stigma
that when it comes to soldiering, to the defense of one's country, to one's
ultimate importance when the chips are down, it's still a man's world. So
not only is the argument for single-sex education not strengthened by the
military dimension of VMI's higher education, it is the least justifiable place
for its acceptance.
The conclusion that the state cannot support sex-segregated higher
education aimed at military training does not necessarily outlaw all such
exclusions in public higher education generally.52 But making the case for
single-sex higher education will not be easy. Nor should it be.
In the VMI litigation, the district court found "very substantial authority
favoring single-sex education." 53 The district court placed heavy reliance on
a 1977 study by Alexander Astin entitled "Four Critical Years," which the
court noted was "not questioned by any expert." ' 54 The Fourth Circuit
favorably cited a summary of the study, which stated:
Single-sex colleges show a pattern of effects on both sexes that is
almost uniformly positive. Students of both sexes become more
academically involved, interact with faculty frequently, show large
increases in intellectual self-esteem, and are more satisfied with
bution of income derived from state's natural resources based upon how long person was
resident of state). The Court noted: "Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state
apportionment of other tights, benefits, and services according to length of residency. It would
permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. Such a result
would be clearly impermissible." Id. at 64.
50. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HLv. L. Ray. 1 (1977).
51. For a thorough analysis of the interconnectedness of citizenship and military service,
see Karst, supra note 46.
52. See, e.g., Caren Dubnoff, Does Gender Equality Always Imply Gender Blindness?
The States of Single-Sex Education for Women, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 295 (1984); David
Hoffman, Comment, Challenge To Single-Sex Schools Under Equal Protection: Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 6 HAzv. WoMaN's L.J. 163, 173-74 (1983); Note, supra note
13, at 1748-53; Jack 0. Steigelfest, Note, The End of an Era for Single-Sex Schools?:
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 15 CoNN. L. Ray. 353, 372-75 (1983).
53. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (W.D. Va. 1991).
54. Id.
1993]
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practically all aspects of college experience (the sole exception is
social life) compared with their counterparts in coeducational insti-
tutions."5
Nevertheless it remains unclear what weight to give these conclusions
in the absence of a full engagement on the issue. The Supreme Court has
yet to meet the matter head on 5 6 and because VMI offered a unique
educational experience not available to men and women, VMI was not the
vehicle for that debate. If the issue is met squarely, it may be that the
findings on single-sex schools are now outdated, indeterminate, or evolving.
It may be that women are the only true beneficiaries of single-gender
experiences precisely because they may need-as men presumably do not-
a "safe haven" from the dampening influence of society's gender stereo-
types. Single-sex education can never be justified except in the context of
an actual educational system where the advantages and disadvantages of
maintaining a gender-segregated system are fully explored. If a system of
higher education includes truly equal male and female single-sex colleges-
a very complicated and delicate inquiry under the best of circumstances-
and if the single-gender programs are not based on conventional and
unproven differences between men and women, separate programs might
pass muster.
III. Ti DARK SIDE OF DIvERsITY: DrvERsTY As A REASON To EXCLUDE
The district court concluded that VMI's male-only admissions policy
was justified as promoting diversity in education. The idea was that VMI
offered a unique program of training and education-indeed, a program
not found anywhere else in the United States-and that the very distinc-
tiveness of the program was reason enough, constitutionally speaking, to
validate it. VMI had to remain all-male because the very uniqueness would
be lost by the introduction of women. The Fourth Circuit seemed to accept
the general validity of a diversity argument, but it did not have to grapple
explicitly with the matter because it posed a different question. The Fourth
Circuit asked, if the VMI program was so positive and unique, and if a
similar all-women's program was also possible, did the state have an
important justification for providing the experience only to men? The court
expressed the question this way: "The decisive question in this case therefore
transforms to one of why the Commonwealth of Virginia offers the oppor-
tunity only to men."
5 s7
But wait, let us go back to the unadorned diversity argument again.
Just how far can an undifferentiated interest in diversity go toward justifying
'educational opportunities limited to one sex, or perhaps one race or ethnic
55. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992).
56. The matter remains open despite Supreme Court opinions in Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), and Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 430 U.S. 703
(1977), aff'g by an equally divided court 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976).
57. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 898.
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group, even if the state is prepared to set up parallel systems for all of the
affected groups?
To address this question squarely, we must first deal with a threshold
issue. Is the interest in diversity the real reason why the state is offering
the single-sex school, or is there another, more honest reason for the state's
gender segregation? Recall that under heightened scrutiny courts will not
accept post hoc rationales for gender discrimination but will seek out the
real justification for a state's policy. Thus in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan,5 the Court disbelieved the state's argument that its
school of nursing was limited to women as a means of providing additional
educational opportunities for women to make up for past discrimination.
The State's primary justification for maintaining the single-sex
admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing is that it compen-
sates for discrimination against women and, therefore, constitutes
educational affirmative action. As applied to the School of Nursing,
we find the State's argument unpersuasive.
In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring
one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists
members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened. However,
we consistently have emphasized that "the mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a
statutory scheme."
5 9  -
In VMI, the Fourth Circuit did pursue this question, but only to a
point. The court was able to find a general state policy of "autonomy and
diversity," but it was unable to find any state policy in favor of single-sex
education in state-supported colleges or universities. To the contrary, the
court found an explicit policy of "affording broad access to higher educa-
tion" and requiring Virginia's colleges and universities to act toward 'fac-
ulty, staff, and students without regard to sex, race, or ethnic origin.'
6
0
Indeed the court noted that if anything, Virginia had, except for VMI,
moved entirely away from gender diversity and had adopted coeducation.
Thus, the court properly called into question and implicitly rejected the
bona tides of a diversity justification for the continuance of VMI as an all-
male institution. This inquiry must be made in every case where the state
is offering diversity as its rationale for single-gender institutions.
But assuming a state did articulate a contemporaneous diversity argu-
ment as the reason for creating segregated schools, is that enough? Here
58. Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
59. Id. at 727-28 (citations omitted) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
648 (1975)).
60. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Commission
on University of 21st Century, reported to Governor and General Assembly of Virginia (1990)).
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we begin to glimpse the dark side of diversity. Diversity was first used as
a compelling justification to include minority racial groups in schools where
their numbers were scant or nonexistent.61 And although every inclusion of
a minority student meant someone else was not admitted, the overall
objective was diversity of the student body as a whole, as a means of
enriching the educational experience for everyone. The words of Justice
Powell in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke6 2 emphasize the
enriching benefits of including students from many different backgrounds:
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to
select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust
exchange of ideas,' petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional
interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner must
be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.
... An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular
background-whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged
or disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school of medicine
experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its
student body and better equip its graduates to render with under-
standing their vital service to humanity. 6
3
In contrast, diversity in the VMI context is a reason to exclude, or to
isolate and separate, constituent groups. By separation we lose the oppor-
tunity to learn from one another's experiences, to see the world from many
different perspectives. By separation we lose the special insight that comes
only from living together and learning together; that is, that there is an
essential equality which we all share and, in any group of people, there are
a range of talents, strengths, and weaknesses. In the United States, the two
great socializing institutions are the schools and the military, and VMI is
essentially both. Segregating men and women in this context will not serve
a Bakke-like diversity; rather, it will cement conformity and close minds.
It may be that isolation and separateness, championed under the slippery
banner of diversity, may serve other valuable functions. And it may be that
the benefits of exclusion overcome other needs. But the burden should rest
on those who support the goal of separateness and exclusion to articulate
and demonstrate some important pedagogic purpose and to show the absence
of harm or stigma to those separated.
One might, for example, be able to demonstrate that men and women
display greater academic accomplishment and more confidence and leader-
ship qualities in a single-gender environment. But that alone is not sufficient
to permit separateness. If the experience is one that reinforces or recreates
stereotypes or if it consigns a separated group to an inferior status, as in
61. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
62. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
63. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313-14 (1978).
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the military context, separate-even if dressed up as "diversity"-is consti-
tutionally unequal.
It should be noted that unexamined arguments of "diversity" can lead
to other forms of mischief as well. Why not have separate racial schools
or separate ethnic schools? Following Brown v. Board of Education, school
authorities in various jurisdictions argued against the imposition of deseg-
regation in their districts, saying that blacks and whites actually performed
better in separate schools and that both groups benefited from the sepa-
rateness. 64 Similiar arguments are now being heard in support of separate
schools for inner-city Black youth.
Diversity can also be turned completely upside-down in some instances.
Beware of diversity used as the reason to exclude certain ethnic groups
whose numbers are viewed as growing "out of proportion" in particular
institutions of higher education. In a sense, "diversity" has been turned
against Asian-Americans, who now face attempts to limit their numbers in
California schools. 65 Some variant on this idea might also have been
appealing to those who sought to limit the number of Jews in Eastern
schools in the earlier part of this century. "Diversity" has too many potential
meanings and too many negative possibilities to be blithely accepted as an
all-purpose justification.
IV. CONCLUSION
One could look at VMI and say, "What's the big deal," the school is
just some peculiar guy thing, a four-year, boys-will-be-boys sleep-over camp.
Or one could say that the legal challenge to VMI is a misguided effort to
stamp out differences between men and women and to impose a needless
conformity in the process. But the essence and symbolism of VMI which
VMI itself holds so dear-its special mission of producing citizen soldiers-
deeply contradicts the idea of equal citizenship for all. It is wrong for the
state to support, endorse, and even celebrate the training of citizen soldiers
and, at the same time, to display the sign: "Women Do Not Qualify." In
our constitutional scheme, both men and women make the grade. Because
of the Fourth Circuit's ruling but despite its reasoning, future VMI cadets
may learn that real growth-real maturity-lies in recognizing this funda-
mental legal and moral principle.
64. See, e.g., Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (1963),
rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
65. See, e.g., Grace W. Tsuang, Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans t6 Highly
Selective Universities, 98 YALE L.J. 659 (1989).
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